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minds of many hearers of Professor Palmer's oral discourses, as the most convincing evidence of his sanity, discrimination, and poise.

There remains a further aspect of this little volume which is of more immediate significance. It is its relation to the movement of contemporary thought. The mind of the present time has been almost completely diverted from the ethics of personality to the ethics of social relationships. The Community, the State, the Labor Union, the Syndicate, the Revolution, have become the units of value. Professor Palmer, on the other hand, has represented to a whole generation of students the classical school of ethics, the analysis of motives, the classification of virtues and vices, the springs of action, the personal ideals. In the hall of Philosophy at Harvard University, Professor Palmer has delivered his famous lectures on the ground floor, while above him were collections illustrating social ethics, or the application of duty to the amelioration of modern life. There seemed to be here a division of fields. The student, having examined with Professor Palmer the nature of goodness, might mount to the second floor and study goodness at work. This apparent separation of being from doing, of character from service, is, however, quietly bridged by the doctrine of the "conjunct self." There is no separate self. One man is no man. Goodness is not achieved until it is socialized. Professor Palmer does not invade the foreign domain of social ethics, as though he marched upstairs in Emerson Hall and appropriated a larger lecture room; he simply indicates the obvious truth that to reach the second story one must enter on the ground floor. His teaching is at once a summary of moral philosophy and an introduction to social ethics. The classical method of analysis underlies the modern movement of reform. Perfect social service is practicable only through perfect moral freedom.

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PANTHEISM AND THE VALUE OF LIFE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. W. S. URQUHART, M.A., D.PHIL. The Epworth Press, London. 1919. Pp. viii, 732. 12s. 6d.

This volume embodies a thesis approved by the University of Aberdeen for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, and appears to be in its entirety the developed form of a minor thesis adversely critical of Hindu pantheism, to which has been added the study of pantheism in the West, as represented by the Stoics, Spinoza, Hegel, and Schopenhauer; against which are urged the same objections as the author

has already made against the Vedanta. These objections are that, in contrast with a belief in a personal, good God, pantheism obscures moral values or denies them altogether and is universally pessimistic or tends to become pessimistic. Whatever is good in Stoicism, whatever is optimistic, is due to the fact that the Stoic was not really pantheistic; whatever is bad and pessimistic in Stoicism, is due to the fact that the Stoic was pantheistic. In other words, in Stoicism we are to see optimism and pessimism, good and bad, but also a theism as well as a pantheism, and we are to credit pantheism with all that is bad and leave the good to the credit of theism.

So with Spinoza, whose pantheism is universally admitted, but to whom, unfortunately, optimism (which ought not to be closely connected with pantheism) is also usually ascribed. Dr. Urquhart concedes that Spinoza is generally classed among optimists, and indeed points out the justification of this view. But he argues that Spinoza's optimism was based on too great confidence in knowledge as a means of salvation from evil. If Spinoza had lived today, he would have been less confident, therefore more pessimistic; hence we may say that his grounds for optimism are accidental, untrustworthy; so that we are justified in doubting whether he was really an optimist, since pessimism is the logical outcome of his teaching.

We submit that this argument is unsatisfactory. In details also, if space permitted, it would be of interest to debate some of the inductions made by the author to the glorification of theism versus pantheism. He implies throughout that love of God is impossible in pantheism, because this love is not personal affection between persisting realities, and conversely a theistic interpretation of the universe should result in the love of God. But it was Aristotle, no pantheist, who said that love of God was an insult to God; and surely no greater devotional love exists than is found in the pantheistic circles dominated by *bhakti*.

Here Dr. Urquhart would rejoin that *bhakti* implies polytheism (better a personal God and saviour); it is not a real adjunct of pantheism, but an emotional reaction. This brings us to the inner kernel of his work, the acute and scholarly criticism of Brahmanic pantheism. We may say at once that it is a real contribution to knowledge, in that it is a clarification, not so much of Hindu thought as of what has been said in respect of that thought. At the same time we question whether the author's synchronous attempt to clarify Hindu thought is legitimate. He would make a distinction, unimpeachable in logical necessity, between real pantheism and theistic pantheism, between real optimism and an optimism found in the Upanishads in

much the form it takes elsewhere: the world is all a fleeting show, but those who know God are released from vanity and sorrow. The Upanishadic restriction to the elect of those likely to enjoy ineffable bliss hereafter is also not unknown outside of pantheism. What we find to admire in Dr. Urquhart's work is far more than what we have to condemn, and it seems invidious to complain that a study of this sort, made by an expert in logical and philosophical discrimination, is too logical, too discriminating, to have its due effect. But such we believe to be the case. It is not till we get to the later systematized Vedanta that we have logic at all or any proper ratiocination. In the confused groping toward a spiritual unity, picturesquely voiced in the contradictory rhapsodies of the first pantheists, it is a mistake to apply a system of interpretation based on too lucid thinking. The Brahma or impersonal Power was forever shifting into the personal All-Soul, as this All-Soul was forever passing from an existence expressed by negations into God whose grace can save. Even the commentators on the Sutras were uncertain and confused, partly because they tried to be both logical and orthodox (that is, not heterodox in rejecting the traditional Word of God), and partly because pantheism in India has always felt divinity personally. When creation is predicated of a Lord of Beings who is represented as wishing ("He *desired*, let me be many") to create, how can we say with the author, "Creation means emission; it is not the definite exercise of conscious power"?

Again, when the ultimate state of the saved is described as that of a bliss too great to portray, when this bliss is said to be the very essence of Brahma, when the blessed, who even before death has a face shining with divine light and, released from all trouble and fear, "experiences bliss indescribable in words," is it not to be untrue to the Hindu scriptures to say that "this tranquil bliss" is unduly negative, and so to deny that pantheism can be optimistic, because the happiness attained is like the Absolute, only negative? Dr. Urquhart concludes that passive contentment without character enough to preserve the soul's personality is not "bliss in the true sense of the word." But it is not a question of what we think the Upanishad authors ought to have thought bliss to be. The bliss they looked forward to was as real to them as Dr. Urquhart's bliss to him, and they thought they were likely to attain it. The author says it was an impossible bliss. But surely the goal is real and obtainable to the Vedantist. The author argues that, energetic desire being excluded by the passive Vedantist and the ideal sought being such as to demand energy, "the goal is unattainable and the bliss

is out of reach." So "joy turns to bitterness and optimism to pessimism." But against this we may urge that the Hindus did not regard the bliss as unattainable, no matter whether they should logically have so considered it; hence the whole argument is vain; there is no conversion of optimism to pessimism to the Upanishad authors. We can still hear them singing hymns of joy that they, the elect few, are saved and about to enter into eternal bliss.

More satisfactory is Dr. Urquhart's discussion of the respective merits of Shankara and Ramanuja as interpreters of Badarayana. Here the author is at his best. He sides with neither as a partisan, but holds that Shankara is right as to the doctrine of illusion, not as interpreter of the earliest Upanishad thought but of the position necessitated in face of the philosophical difficulties; and that Ramanuja is right, as interpreting the Sutras, in claiming that the individual soul is real, but wrong here as interpreter of the Upanishads. The discussion of the Puranas is less satisfactory. These tracts represent merely the survival of original polytheism; pantheism has had little effect on this worship. The Hindus *en masse* are only nominally pantheists, users of taught phrases culled from superior minds; the many are, as they have always been, polytheistic. The hereafter that appeals to them is one of emotional fullness. A most valuable and searching criticism is the author's extended survey of the religious ideas of Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore, the latter justly scored as disguising his indebtedness to Western thought. Our own opinion is that Vivekananda was a good deal of a fakir, and Rabindranath is of no importance whatever; but those who enjoy his rather mushy religion will also welcome the opportunity presented by this estimate, very readable as well as fair, to see in what regard Rabindranath differs from the really Oriental, respectively Hindu, attitude toward life. The author might have made more of one point — that there has always been a healthy realization of life and its duties in the theistically shaded pantheism of India; it is a side of religion ignored by the effete talkers of present-day India but not by the virile Hindus of antiquity. The Bhagavad Gita does not praise a life of intellectual or physical indolence, but one of active endeavor; not pretty dreams but honest work in the world is a man's life, if he is to be fit to live hereafter with a God who says "I too work ever."

Dr. Urquhart has written a book which is not only a valuable contribution to the history of Indian thought but a quickening work, likely to rouse those for whom it raises the all-important question, Is your pantheism the best religion possible? Dr. Urquhart demon-

strates that in so far as pantheism is pessimistic it has a deadening effect, and reasonably advises all pantheists to take up a better, optimistic religion, which will put more life into the belief, more energy into the believer, and more happiness into the world. We agree fully that religion ought to make the whole world happier and that pantheism has not done much for the world at large. Only we question whether belief can be set aside for practical reasons, and whether the test of intellectual validity is to be found in the stimulus it exerts upon the believer's morale.

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THE RELIGIOUS TEACHING OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. ALBERT C. KNUDSON.
The Abingdon Press. 1918. Pp. 416. \$2.50.

Consideration of the influence which this book is likely to exercise in the great Methodist denomination makes one feel grateful that Professor Knudson has done such a careful and scholarly piece of work. Only fourteen years ago his predecessor, Professor Hinckley G. Mitchell, lost his chair in Boston University because he would not assert the historicity of the early chapters of Genesis. The Board of Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church regarded this as sufficient ground for refusing to confirm his reappointment to the chair of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis.

But a decade has wrought great changes. A sound, judicious progressiveness is apparently in the ascendant and this book is to be welcomed as one of its products. The author stands squarely upon the solid gains of modern biblical criticism in his presentation of the religious teaching of the Old Testament. This is quite evident in the excellent opening chapter, which gives an outline of the development of Old Testament religion and literature. One wonders, however, whether he has gained as much as he has lost by adopting the topical mode of discussion, even if he had in mind primarily the practical needs of the preacher. There are some aspects of Israel's religion that can be treated apart from the general history of the people. But others are deprived of a large measure of their human interest by dissociation from the historical movements in which they originated. It is difficult to see how the religious significance and consequences of the Deuteronomic movement can be presented under a topical treatment which focuses attention on certain abstract features of Israel's religion. But we must assume that the author accepted the disadvantages of this method to achieve certain ends which he had in view.